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11 Introduction
Dened as a set of economic activities that take place outside the framework of bureaucratic
establishments (aside from crime and domestic labour), the informal economy includes en-
terprises, workers, as well as consumers, which are all connected in a myriad ways (see, e.g.,
Hart, 2008; Pickhardt and Shinnick, 2008). In their case studies ranging from New York
City and Madrid to Uruguay and Colombia, Portes and Haller (2005) vividly shows the ways
through which informality is exhibited in both developing and developed countries. Indeed,
in an attempt to quantify the extent of informality, Buehn and Schneider (2007), while ac-
knowledging the presence of methodological problems in estimating its magnitude by virtue of
the subject, computes that informality is quite widespread in developing countries (around 50
percent of their GDPs) and certainly not an insignicant matter in advanced nations (around
20 percent of their GDPs).
Informality manifests in many guises, from unregistered street vendors who sell almost
anything from plastic toys to HI-FI equipment, elbow-to-elbow on busy streets, to big man-
ufacturing industries that underreport their turnovers or, perhaps more intelligently, sub-
contract some of their activities to rms that are prone to employ informal labour. These all
imply that informality will also have a rich array of eects on the economy and societal life
(for a selection of studies, see Perry et al., 2007; World Bank, 2007; Gatti and Honorati, 2008;
Pickhardt and Shinnick, 2008; Oviedo et al., 2009). Although the added entrepreneurial spirit
occasionally observed in the shadow economy (as lucidly discussed in The Other Path by de
Soto, 1989) deserves mention, informality has almost always been seen as a hampering factor
in the development of economies, mainly due to the under-provisioning of publicly-provided
goods (for an early contribution, see Loayza, 1997).
As is well known, the propensity of economic agents to free-ride in the provision of non-
excludable and non-rivalrous goods continues to occupy a pivotal role in the eld of public
economics, following Samuelson's (1954) initial setting (see also Musgrave, 1987). If those
involved in the informal economy cannot be excluded from using such goods{e.g. public
2roads{nanced by the formal economy, the standard free-riding response would be to remain
informal. Although the informality born from free-riding is denitely not insignicant, the
literature has generally conceived informality within the club goods framework, where non-
rivalry continues to stand but exclusion is considered possible (Buchanan, 1965). Thus,
formality refers to paying taxes in order to become a member of the club and access to
collectively-produced non-rivalrous goods that would be expected to increase rms' prots,
as in the case of law and order: formal rms would benet from the legal system in the
case of a business dispute whereas informal ones would not. Furthermore, although informal
operators refrain from paying taxes, the ip side is that there usually exists an associated
cost of being detected and punished accordingly. Economic agents are therefore expected to
conduct a cost-and-benet analysis before they decide where to position themselves on the
formality-informality scale. Eorts to explain informality as a choice outcome for economic
agents take this cost-and-benet framework as a point of departure, as Gerxhani (2004) and
Oviedo et al. (2009) discuss thoroughly in their survey studies.
More specically, the bulk of the economic literature focuses on variations in rm-specic
characteristics that act as explanatory variables in determining whether to be formal or infor-
mal. Given an economic environment characterised by issues including institutional quality,
nancial market development, tax burden and the extent of regulation, rms' decisions are
conceived to be derived from their heterogeneities, captured by variations in, inter alia, tech-
nology, initial wealth and size. Attempts have almost always been made to capture the
interdependencies between rm-specic variations and the parameters of the economic envi-
ronment. A sampling of the extensive research in this area includes, for instance, Chong and
Gradstein (2007), who proposed a formal model where a positive relationship exists between
income inequality among economic agents and informality, a relationship that is amplied un-
der weak institutional quality (as proxied by return to rent-seeking activities). Dabla-Norris
et al. (2008), on the other hand, found that the heterogeneity of a rm's productivity is neg-
atively correlated with informality; they also claim that the weaker the institutional quality
(as proxied by legal enforcement), the larger the informal sector. Finally, in a recent study,
3Dreher et al. (2009) captured the relationship between legal enforcement, informality and the
extent of corruption, given that rms vary in earning ability.
This line of research is obviously illuminating to the extent that rm characteristics and the
quality of the institutional environment can be observed via objective measures{as generally
noted by existing empirical studies (see the above mentioned papers as well as other studies
such as Johnson et al., 1998; Friedman et al., 2000; Torgler and Schneider, 2009). However,
economic agents also have perceptions, which may very well aect their behaviour. An obvious
case in this sense would be where rms vary in their perceptions of institutional quality
(such as to what extent regulations are enforced and how eectively taxes are used). Since
perceptions are formed through a set of signals and experiences (viz. past performance of the
government, the media and assessments by other entrepreneurs [Oviedo et al., 2009]) that are
likely idiosyncratic, they are subjective and thus not observable. In settings where perceptions
do matter, this unobservability could create a strategic uncertainty in the sense that a rm's
behaviour would depend not only on the perceptions of that rm, but on those of others as
well. How, then, might perceptions, which have so far remained unexplored in the literature,
be incorporated into a formal model that aims to explain informality?
Motivated by such concerns, this paper provides a game-theoretical model that captures
the relationship between how rms perceive eective governance (the ecient use of tax
revenues) and their decision to be formal or informal under incomplete information. The
model therefore takes into account rms' perceptions of how eective the state is in making
use of collected taxes, as well as their beliefs about the perceptions of other players. In order
to highlight the eect of perceptions on the choice of informality, it is assumed that rms
are ex ante identical. Formality is conceived here as a club good, providing exclusive benets
to its members in return for tax payments. Informality, on the other hand, does not involve
tax payments, but disallows its members to benet from public services and carries the risk
of being detected and held liable to a ne. Furthermore, club goods are viewed as requiring
a minimum amount of tax revenue to cover their xed costs. Firms' actions thus exhibit
strategic complementarities in the sense that their incentive to operate formally grows as the
4number of rms choosing to be formal increases. When the state of fundamental, i.e. the
level of governance eectiveness, is common knowledge among rms (which is the benchmark
case), the game has multiple equilibria depending on its level: in the low states of the world
(viz. eectiveness is low), nobody participates in the formal sector; whereas in the high states
of the world (viz. eectiveness is high), everyone does. In the intermediate values of the state
of the fundamentals, there are two pure-strategy equilibria, where all rms are either formal
or informal.
The novelty emerges when a small noise is introduced to governance eectiveness, i.e. when
rms form their own subjective perceptions. Consequently, a unique equilibrium outcome can
be identied for any realised eectiveness level. If rms doubt that public funds will be used
eectively and furthermore believe that a suciently large number of rms think the same,
they may suspect that collected taxes will not meet the threshold and hence the club good
will not be provided{and therefore choose be informal. On the other hand, if they trust the
government and believe that a suciently large number of rms do as well, they will likely
think that collected taxes will warrant the provision of the club good{and choose to be formal.
Thus, the unique equilibrium outcome is driven by self-fullling beliefs. In order to formally
analyse this situation, the paper employs the \global games" technique (as rst introduced
by Carlsson and van Damme, 1993, and developed by Morris and Shin, 1998, 2003).
There are indeed models that capture informality as a self-fullling outcome (see, e.g.,
Johnson et al., 1998; Friedman et al., 2000; Dessy and Pallage, 2003). Yet the characterisation
of these models under complete information setting is destined to provide multiple equilibria.
Thus, the choice of picking one among many turns out to be based on an ad-hoc criterion. In
our model, however, the level of incomplete information on governance eectiveness, together
with an appropriate tool to analyse such cases (global games), enables us to determine the
informality size as a unique equilibrium outcome, which may be seen as another contribution
of the paper.
The paper is structured as follows: the benchmark model is established in Section 2;
incomplete information is introduced in Section 3; a comparative statics analysis is performed
5on the ex ante size of informality by altering the tax rate in Section 4; the optimal scal policy
is investigated in Section 5; Section 6 presents extensions; and nally Section 7 concludes the
paper.
2 The benchmark model
2.1 The environment and entry to club (formal sector) game
There are a continuum of rms with a unit mass, indexed by i 2 [0;1]. Firms are identical,
and each is endowed with a technology that generates a prot  > 0. Each rm chooses an
action, ai 2 f0;1g, where 0 and 1 indicate participation in the informal and the formal sector,




Those who choose to participate in the formal sector pay a per-head tax t > 0 and benet
from the public service if provided. The total tax collected is therefore T = tF.
The public service considered is a club good, which excludes non-payers. We assume that
it increases the productivity of rms that are in the club, has a xed cost C > 0, and is
nanced by collected taxes. We hereby consider services that likely require signicant xed
costs, such as law-and-order and access to publicly-provided R&D. Should tax revenues cover
its xed cost, then the public service is provided; otherwise, the tax revenue is burned. We
assume that t  C, so if a suciently large number of rms paid taxes, the public service
would be provided.
The quality of the public service provided depends on eective governance. The type of
the government is characterised by a state of fundamentals , which is an index of eective
governance, a number in [0;1]. Let q() denote the quality of the public service, where q() is
a strictly increasing function of . At the outset, we assume that q() = , where  > 0 is
the marginal return from public service.
If provided, rms in the formal sector would benet from the public service in terms of
increased productivity, which depends on its quality. Thus, the payo of a formal rm is
6[1+] t. The rm would not enjoy a boost in productivity only when the level of trust is
at its lowest level. And nally, if the public service was not provided, then the payo of the
rm in the formal sector became    t. We assume that t < .
Firms that choose not to participate in the formal sector, on the other hand, pay no taxes
but are unable to benet from the public service because of its club good nature. In addition,
the government audits rms randomly, and if a rm is caught then the government captures
its prot as a ne. Let k() denote the probability of being caught and penalized, with the
assumption the more the eective the government is the higher the success rate of the audit
would be. We posit that k() = . Thus, the expected payo of a rm operating in the
informal sector is [1   ]. We further assume that the expected ne, , will just cover the
auditing expense of the government, and thus may be seen as a deadweight loss.
Summarizing the above discussion, the payo of a rm is
ui(ai;F;) = ai[(1 + 1 I(C  tF))   t] + (1   ); (1)
where 1 I is an indicator function.
In this economy, the action of rms, ai, and the proportion of the population that chooses
the formal sector, F, are strategic complements. The more people in the formal sector, the
more likely that the public service will be provided, and therefore the more likely that any
rm's best action would be to participate in the formal sector.
2.2 Entry decision of the rms
When the governance eectiveness is very low, the quality of public service (if provided) and
the probability of getting caught in the informal sector will also be very low. Even if all
rms were in the formal sector (thus the public service was provided), the best response of
a rm would be to stay informal regardless of its belief about what others will do. Denote
(t)  t=(1 + ) as the value of  at which a rm is indierent to being formal or informal
when the public service is provided. Dene [0;(t)) as the lower dominance region.
7When the governance eectiveness is very high, on the other hand, the probability of being
caught is so high that, even if there are no rms in the formal sector (thus the public service
is not provided), the best response of a rm would be to stay formal. Denote (t)  t= as
the value of  at which the rm is indierent to being formal or informal when the public
service is not provided. Dene the region ( (t);1] as the upper dominance region.2
Observing that for all t, (t) < (t), the space of fundamentals are partitioned into three
categories. When  is in the lower dominance region, every rm would choose the informal
sector, irrespective of the proportion of other rms in the informal sector. When  is in
the upper dominance region, rms would prefer being in the formal sector, irrespective of the
proportion of rms in the formal sector. When (t)    (t), a rm's decision to participate
in the formal sector would depend on the proportion of rms in the formal sector. There are
multiple equilibria in this region due to the self-fullling nature of the beliefs. For a given
level of , if everyone believes that the public service will be provided, then everyone will
participate and the public service will indeed be provided and everyone's belief will therefore
be fullled in the equilibrium. If, on the other hand, rms believe an insucient number of
players will be in the formal sector and the public service will thus not be provided, then
they will choose to stay out of the formal sector and again their beliefs will be fullled in the
equilibrium.
The game among rms when  is in the intermediate region is a coordination game with two
pure strategy equilibria, one of which is Pareto superior. As stated in the Introduction section,
earlier literature studying informality addressed the self-fullling nature of informality and
discussed the two equilibria that may arise, failing to come up with a satisfactory equilibrium
selection criterion other than relying on an ad hoc selection of one of the equilibria based
on initial conditions. However, as discussed by Morris and Shin (2003), this multiplicity of
equilibria can be an artifact of a common knowledge assumption on the fundamentals. In
the following section, as we drop the common knowledge assumption and introduce a small
amount of uncertainty concerning the governance eectiveness in the model, we show that
2Under the assumption that C  t <  there will be non-trivial upper and lower dominance regions.
8each state of fundamentals will give rise to a unique equilibrium outcome.
3 Firms with private signals
We hereby assume that rms do not observe the true value of the governance eectiveness .
Firms have common prior for  and believe that it is drawn from a uniform distribution over
[0;1].
When the true state is , rm i receives a signal xi = +i, where i is independently and
uniformly distributed over [ ;]. The signal can be thought of as the rm's private opinion
regarding the governance eectiveness. Based on the signal observed, the rm decides whether
to participate in the formal or informal sector.
There are two roles attributed to private signals. First, they provide information on
the governance eectiveness, hence on the expected quality of the public service and the
eectiveness of auditing activity. The lower the signal, the lower the expected quality of the
public service and the probability of getting caught and thus the higher the incentive to choose
the informal sector. Second, they give information on other rms' signals, which helps a rm
infer what others will do. A rm that has a low opinion regarding the governance eectiveness
will believe others also think the government is not trustworthy and that the public service
is less likely to be provided{hence it will probably choose to be informal.
Once rms have decided to enter either the formal or the informal sector, the government
observes the realized proportion of rms in the formal sector. If tF  C, then the the public
service will be provided at the quality level . The sequencing of when the government
observes the true {be at the beginning of the game or following the rms' entry decision{
has no importance at all for our analysis, for it cannot be used instrumentally, since the
government has no active role in our model.
The payos of the game are as described in Section 2. We characterize the Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of the game among the rms. As in the complete information model, there are
ranges of good and bad fundamentals, at which a rm's best response is independent of its
9beliefs about the actions of other. Recall that (t) is the lowest value of  below which the
rm will choose to be informal. As the dierence between the rm's signal and the true 
is at most , a rm will choose to be informal whenever it observes a signal xi < (t)   .
As t increases, the threshold (t) increases also. Since t  C, when (C) > 2, there will be
feasible values of  for which all rms receive signals that lead them to believe that  is in the
lower dominance region, for any t  C.3 Similarly, if a rm receives a signal xi >  (t) + ,
it will choose to be formal. Since  () = 1, there exists an  for every t <  such that
 (t) < 1 2, and there will be feasible values of  for which all rms receive signals that lead
them to believe that  is in the upper dominance region.
As discussed in global games theory (Morris and Shin, 2003), the game has a unique equi-
librium outcome.4 In this equilibrium, strategies are cut-o rules.
Proposition 1. There is a unique equilibrium in which rms choose to be informal if they





t ) + 1]
(2)
and be formal above.
The equilibrium behaviour of rms is standard in global games. We provide the intuition of
the Proposition 1 here, referring the reader to Morris and Shin (2003) for a formal treatment.
Suppose all rms follow the above threshold strategy. Now consider a marginal rm that
receives the signal (t). What are its beliefs about the proportion of rms which are formal?
In the unique equilibrium, this will be equal to its beliefs about the proportion of rms which
have observed signals above (t). Thus, given the threshold strategy of rms, the proportion
3While conducting our analysis we focus on the case when the noise in the signal approaches to zero; thus,
it is sucient to assume C
(1+) > 0.
4Global games have been used to model speculative attacks in currency markets (Morris and Shin 1998,
Guimaraes and Morris, 2007), debt crisis (Morris and Shin, 2004), bank runs (Goldstein and Pauzner, 2005),
and regime changes (Edmond, 2008).
10of rms that choose to be formal is the proportion that observes a signal above (t) + .
Because  is uniformly distributed, the rm will have a uniform belief on those rms choosing
to be formal.
Now if the noise is small, the behaviour of the marginal rm will be close to that of a
rm who knows  and has a belief over its uniform distribution. The public service will be
provided if the proportion of rms that are formal is at least C=t. Thus, the expected return
of being formal is
Z C=t
0
(   t)dF +
Z 1
C=t
[(1 + )   t]dF: (3)
The return of being informal, regardless of whether the public service is provided or not, is
Z 1
0
[1   ]dF: (4)
The marginal rm that observes (t) will be indierent to being formal and informal when














The left-hand side of the equation is the expected marginal benet from being in the formal
sector (through increased quality), where 1   C
t is the probability that the public service will
be provided. The right-hand side is the marginal cost of being in the formal sector.
From Proposition 1 we can calculate, at every realisation of governance eectiveness ,
the proportion of rms who are formal.5 Let F(;(t)) be a function that species the pro-
portion of rms who are formal when the governance eectiveness is  and all rms follow the
threshold strategy given in Proposition 1. Then, in equilibrium, the proportion of rms who
are formal is given by F(;(t)) = prob(  (t)+). All rms are formal if true  is greater
5The following line of argumentation follows Goldstein and Pauzner (2005).
11than (t)+, since all rms will receive signals above (t). All rms are informal if true  is
less than (t) , since all rms will receive signals below (t). Finally, F(;(t)) increases
linearly between (t)  and (t)+ as both  and  are uniformly distributed. Thus we have:
Corollary 1. Given t, the proportion of rms in the formal sector depends only on the
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2 if (t)       (t) + 
1 if   (t) + :
(6)
Note that the proportion of the population who is in the formal sector is an increasing
function of true . As (t) 2 ((t);  (t)), there are regions of fundamentals where being
informal is not a dominant strategy, yet rms choose to be informal. This outcome is entirely
driven by low expectations, corresponding to a coordination failure.
After setting out the model, we now turn our attention to the eect of tax on the size of
informality, as being the only policy tool in our model.
4 The eect of tax on the size of informality
Corollary 1 presented the ex ante size of informality in this economy. Now, we analyze the
eect of tax on the size of informality.









t ) + 1)
2: (7)
Increasing tax, t, has two eects on the threshold signal. First, it increases the cost of entry
to the club. Second, it reduces the threshold rate of formal rms required to warrant the
provision of the club good, thus increasing the probability that the club good will be pro-
12vided. If   1, the numerator in expression (7) is positive since we assumed that C  t.
Therefore, d=dt is always positive. The increase in the marginal expected benet of being
formal (rather than informal) via the increased probability of club good's being provided
does not compensate for the net cost of being formal. Therefore, higher tax requires higher
 to make a rm indierent to being formal or informal. On the other hand, when  > 1,
the net balance of both eects is not monotone. For t < ^ t, the threshold  is decreasing in
t, and for t > ^ t, it is increasing, where ^ t 
2C
1+. Note that ^ t 2 (C;), if the cost of pub-





). Thus, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2. When   1, the higher the taxes, the higher the size of informality. When
 > 1, the size of informality rst decreases then increases in t.
Observe that for the case of  > 1, when the tax is set very low, rms would refrain from
joining the formal sector for fear that the collected amount will be insucient to nance the
public service; whereas when the tax is set very high, rms would again keep out of the formal
sector, this time thinking that the cost of entering it will not justify benets from the public
service{a Laer curve eect.
For the rest of the analysis, where we will be discussing the optimal scal policy, we will
focus on the more interesting case of  > 1.
5 Optimal scal policy
We characterize the optimal scal policy of a benevolent government and ascribe to her the
objective of maximizing the expected welfare of the rms.6 When there is complete infor-
mation and rms coordinate on the Pareto superior equilibrium outcome, which is everyone
6In our basic model, the government announces scal policy ex ante and commits to it. It could be argued
that the government knows its true type when it decides on the optimal scal policy. However, if this is the
case, then rational players should take into account the informational content of the announced scal policy
in forming their best response. See Angeletos et al. (2006) for signaling in global games.




[1   ]d +
Z 1
(t)
[(1 + )   t]d: (8)
The ex ante welfare depends on all realisations of . When   (t), the rm is informal and
receives [1   ]. When   (t), the rm is formal and receives [(1 + )   t]. Recalling
that (t) is increasing in t, maximizing the expected welfare subject to the budget constraint
yields the rst best tax rate tFB = C.
When there is incomplete information, for a given tax rate t, the ex ante expected welfare





[1   ]d +
Z 1
(t)
[(1 + )   t]d: (9)
Similiar to the above case, the ex ante welfare depends on all realisations of . When
  (t), the rm is informal and it receives [1   ]. When   (t), the rm is formal
and it receives [(1 + )   t].
Proposition 3. The welfare maximizing tax is t, where C < t < ^ t.
Proof. The ex ante welfare is rewritten as
W(t;












The expected welfare of the representative rm is made up of prots, minus the expected tax
payment, minus the expected ne paid if the rm is informal, plus the expected gain from
public service if the rm is formal.
Taking the derivative of (10) with respect to t, we obtain
dW(t;(t))
dt











14The second term in brackets is always positive because of equation (5). When t  ^ t, (t) is
non-decreasing in t. Thus, for t  ^ t we have dW(t;(t))=dt  0. For t < ^ t, (t) is decreasing
in t. At t = C, dW(t;(t))=dt > 0 if C(1    + 2) >  and at t = ^ t, dW(t;(t))=dt < 0.7


































t ) + 1)
3; (13)
which is always positive{thus, (t) is convex in t.
Therefore, the second order derivative of W(t;(t)) with respect to t is negative when
t < ^ t. Hence, W(t;(t)) is concave in t 2 [C;^ t], implying that there exists t 2 (C;^ t) such
that, for t < t, welfare decreases in t, and for t > t, welfare increases in t. Q.E.D.
Note that under incomplete information, there is excessive taxation, t > C. Taking the
model presented here as a base one, we can make extensions to incorporate various additional
dimensions that have so far not been considered. Thus in the next section, we explore two
paths to extend our model. The rst considers a case where, in addition to a club good, a
public one is also provided through the taxes collected. The second presents an environment
where rms are assumed to be heterogeneous with respect to size.
7Recall that when  > 1 and C < (1 + )=2, there exists ^ t 2 (C;). Now we require that C >
=(1    + 2). A simple algebra shows that the two conditions are simultaneously satised when  > 1.
156 Extensions
6.1 Public good and club good
Consider a case where the government, rather than spending all taxes collected on a club
good, allocates the tax revenues between the club good (which is excludable) and the public
one (non-excludable).
We modify the model as follows. Let  2 [;1] be the proportion of tax revenues spent
on the club good.8 The government announces  as part of its scal policy and commits to
it. As before, assume that C is the xed cost of the club good. The public good has no xed
cost and its production exhibits constant returns to scale in that every dollar spent in public
good returns a service of a dollar worth.
If tF  C, then the club good is provided and the rest of the budget is spent on the
provision of public good. If tF < C, then all revenue collected is spent on the public good
and no club good is provided.
Then, the payo of a rm is
ui(ai;F;) = ai[(1 + 1 I(C  tF))   t] + (1   )
+ tF   1 I(C  tF)[(1   )tF + C]:
(14)
The marginal rm observing (t) will be indierent to being formal or informal when the
expected returns of being formal equals the expected returns of being informal.
R C=t
0 [   t(1   F)]dF +
R 1
C=t[(1 + )   t(1   F)   C]dF =
R C=t
0 [(1   ) + tF]dF +
R 1
C=t[(1   ) + tF   C]dF:
(15)







8We rule out the case where all tax revenues are spent on public good. We also restrict the parameter
space to cases where C < t < t < .
16Observe that  = 1 brings us back to the main model. Similar to the base model, for
 > 1, the threshold  decreases in t for t <
2C
(1+) and then increases. As for , the higher
the  the lower the threshold . Thus, we have
Proposition 4. The size of informality increases as the proportion of taxes spent on public
goods increases.
As expected, the provision of a public good suers from the free-rider problem. When
revenues are spent completely on the club good,  = 1, the resulting ineciency (in terms of
rms coordinating on being informal even though it is not the dominant strategy) is solely due
to the coordination problem. As  decreases, the government allocates part of the revenues
to providing the public good and the size of informality further rises due to free-riding. Thus,
the increase in the size of informality when  < 1 when compared to  = 1 is attributed to
the free-rider problem.
6.2 Heterogeneity
In the base model, rms were assumed to be identical ex ante. Now, consider that there are
two types of rms. Firms are endowed with technologies that generate prots S < L, for
small- and large-sized rms, respectively. The proportion of large rms in the population is
 and the proportion of small rms is 1   .9 Here we consider the case where the prot of
small rms is assumed to be so low that even when the quality of the public service is at the
highest level, joining the formal sector is not worthwhile, i.e. (1 + )S < C.10 The rest of
the model is as before.
Small rms will always choose to be informal regardless of the behaviour of larger rms,
who will play the coordination game among themselves as described in the base model. A
9Here we assume that there is a critical mass of large-sized rms,  ; for the problem not to be trivial, and
we further assume C <  t < t < .
10The case where the prots of small rms are marginally lower than those of large ones is not considered
here, since it would complicate the analysis to an extent that surpasses the scope of this paper.
17large rm believes that rms that choose to be formal are uniformly distributed in [0;]. The
marginal large rm observing (t;) will be indierent to being formal or informal when the
expected returns of being formal equals the expected returns of being informal.
Z C=t
0
(   t)dF +
Z 
C=t
[(1 + )   t]dF =
Z 
0
[1   ]dF: (17)













Observe that  = 1 brings us back to the base model. As  decreases, i.e. the proportion of
large rms in the economy decreases, the threshold level of governance eectiveness increases,
implying larger proportion of rms being informal.




> > > > <
> > > > :








if (t;)       (t;) + 
 if   (t;) + :
(19)
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we modelled the eect of perceptions of governance eectiveness on informality
size. To this end, a strategic-form game was constructed among rms that decide to partic-
ipate in either the formal or the informal sector. Members of the formal sector pay a tax to
enter the club and benet from productive public services, while others avoid taxes but also
relinquish the right to benet from increased productivity and face a ne in case they are
caught.
In a game of complete information regarding governance eectiveness, which was our
benchmark model, the game was found to have Pareto-rankable multiple equilibria depending
18on the value of eectiveness. When rms had incomplete information on governance eec-
tiveness, on the other hand, they formed their own perceptions. In the unique Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of the game, rms follow threshold strategies and choose to be formal if a signal
of eectiveness is observed above a certain threshold, and choose to be informal otherwise.
However, in this unique equilibrium, they may coordinate on the risk-dominant one, an equi-
librium that is not always Pareto superior. More specically, there are levels of governance
eectiveness where rms in equilibrium will choose to be informal despite the fact that be-
ing formal is the Pareto-dominant outcome for all{a consequence that emerges as a result of
coordination failure.
Having pinned down the unique equilibrium of the game, we characterised the probability
of a rm being informal in this economy and labelled it as the ex ante measure of informality.
The size of the formal sector was found to increase with governance eectiveness for any given
level of tax rate, a result which conforms with the empirical ndings of Johnson et al. (1998),
Friedman et al. (2000), Chong and Gradstein (2007), Dabla-Norris et al. (2008) and Dehrer
et al. (2009).
By using the described model, we furthermore conducted comparative statics and showed,
rst of all, that as the tax rate (entry fee to the club) increased, informality size rst de-
clined (as in Friedman et al., 2000, and Elgin, 2010) and then increased for a given level of
governance eectiveness and a suciently large marginal return from public service. Second,
we characterised the optimal scal policy of a benevolent government whose objective is to
maximise the ex ante welfare of the representative rm. We found, as expected, that when
information is incomplete the optimal tax rate exceeds that compared to when information
is complete.
Finally, among possible paths, we extended the model rst by considering a government
that allocated its revenues both on club goods and public goods, and second by incorporating
heterogeneity among rms in terms of size. The former line of extension allowed us to dier-
entiate between the eect of coordination failure and that of free-riding on informality size.
The latter, on the other hand, paralleled the existing literature that grounds the coexistence
19of formal and informal rms on the heterogeneity of rm characteristics and showed that at
suciently high levels of eectiveness the economy may embody both formal and informal
rms.
Overall, the paper provides a fresh perspective to the literature on informality. First,
it introduces an additional dimension in shaping the size of the informal sector, that being
the varying perceptions of economic agents on governance. Second, it suggests that using
the strategic-form game with incomplete information{known as \global games"{best suits
the problem at hand. Third, as a result, characterising the size of informality as a unique
outcome of the game was made possible. Fourth, it is observed that in this setting informality
may well arise ineciently as a result of a coordination failure.
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